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THE IMF MUST DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES BEFORE
GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOCURRENCIES
DESTABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following hypothetical—Russia, under economic sanctions
from the West (i.e., the Western Bloc, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, etc.) which bar consumers from conducting
business with Russian corporations, introduces a government-backed
cryptocurrency (“the e-Ruble”), accessible to all members of the European
continent, both European Union (EU) members and non-members.1 Russian
corporations, hoping to re-enter the European markets, propose their customers
use this Russian-backed cryptocurrency to circumvent the sanctions.
European citizens, seeing the benefits of the e-Ruble—particularly its crossborder reach and lower transaction fees—begin using this Russian-backed
cryptocurrency, increasing demand for the e-Ruble and weakening the Euro.2
Furthermore, China, in an economic alliance with Russia, permits Chinese
corporations to conduct business using the e-Ruble.3 European consumers and
businesses, now allowed to use the e-Ruble in two of the largest export markets
and six of the largest eleven world economies, further weaken by lowering its
demand.4

1
This is not a far-off hypothetical; the potential for this scenario is very real. See Anthony Cuthbertson,
Iran Plans National Cryptocurrency to Evade U.S. Sanctions, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-national-cryptocurrency-us-sanctionsbitcoin-trumpa8512596.html; Max Seddon & Martin Arnold, Putin Considers ‘Cryptorouble’ as Moscow Seeks to Evade
Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/54d026d8-e4cc-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da?
segmentId=6132a895-e068-7ddc-4cec-a1abfa5c8378.
2
For the purposes of this hypothetical, Russian exports of natural gas, oil, minerals, and certain
manufactured goods to Europe are significant. As such, European consumers and businesses are dependent on
Russian imports as Russia is not under economic sanctions from the EU. See Russia, U.S. ENERGY ADMIN. (Mar.
12, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140324135804/http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=rs; see
also EU Imports of Energy Products—Recent Developments, EUROSTAT (May 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf (“Special focus is given to Russia as the main supplier of
petroleum oils and natural gas to the EU.”).
3
We assume China is working on its own cryptocurrency, but, for now, permits Chinese corporations to
use the e-Ruble. See, e.g., Emily Feng, Facebook’s Digital Money Plan Raises Stakes for China’s
Cryptocurrency Ambitions, NPR (July 31, 2019, 8:46AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/31/742223881/
facebooks-digital-money-plan-raises-stakes-for-china-s-cryptocurrency-ambitions.
4
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2018, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last
visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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Seeking revenge on the EU, and the West more broadly, for previously
imposed economic sanctions, Russia initiates a speculative attack on the Euro.5
In an attempt to ensure EU citizens have a stable, sovereign currency not under
Russia’s control, the EU rushes to adopt its own “e-Euro,” which has similar
characteristics to the e-Ruble. Reminded of the Cold War, the EU also urges the
United States to adopt its own government-backed cryptocurrency, sensing that
this could be the next front of attack for Russia. These actions spur reactionary
measures by both developed and developing countries,6 and soon after, the world
is fighting through currency manipulation. The front for the war is governmentbacked cryptocurrencies and there is no established framework for oversight,
nor is there an international organization capable of containing the “fighting” or
its national and international consequences. The near constant currency
manipulation, amid global adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency,
results in the collapse of the international monetary system, setting the globe
back nearly eighty years.
While this scenario may seem far-fetched, the characteristics of
cryptocurrency make it a distinct possibility.7 Cryptocurrencies, and the
technology underlying them, are promising technological advancements.8
However, some of the characteristics that make the technology so promising are
also the characteristics which could lead to a minor problem spiraling out of
control. Government-backed cryptocurrency poses a threat to the stability of the
international monetary system and, barring rapid and proactive measures, the
international community risks sustaining significant injury to the infrastructure
of the international economy.

5
See Ed Howden, Comment, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain Future, 29
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 773 (2015) (“A speculative attack is considered a massive devaluation of a country’s
currency brought on by the selling of the country’s currency.”).
6
This is described as the “Herding Effect.” See discussion infra Part II.B.
7
See discussion infra Part III.B.
8
See generally, Michael Crosby et al., BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, 2016 APPLIED
INNOVATION REV. (discussing cryptocurrencies).
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Cryptocurrency9 is the flavor of the month (or decade), and the darling of
Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and Main Street.10 But it is not all sunshine and
rainbows; the volatility of Bitcoin, and other cryptos, has been covered adnauseum.11 While “cryptocurrency” often evokes worries of “price volatility,”
this is not the biggest threat posed by cryptocurrency.12 Cryptocurrencies,
specifically government-backed cryptocurrencies,13 present a threat to the
stability of the international monetary and financial systems.14

9
“Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrency, applying different
nomenclatures and definitions.” Hearing on Examining Regulatory Frameworks for Digital Currencies and
Blockchain Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. 4 (July 30, 2019)
(statement of Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance). Among the most commonly
used terminology are “digital currency,” “virtual currency,” “virtual commodity,” “virtual asset,” “electronic
currency,” and “payment token.” GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE
WORLD 1 (June 2018) [hereinafter GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD]. While there is other common
vocabulary associated with cryptocurrencies, the idea here is to hopefully avoid confusing many different
concepts with each other, an example of which would be “utility tokens.” Id. at 78.
10
See generally, Libra White Paper, LIBRA (July 23, 2019), https://libra.org/en-US/white-paper/
(discussing plans for cryptocurrency); Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings,
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton2017-12-11 (showing Wall Street and Main Street Interest); see also, e.g., Steve Fiorillo, Bitcoin History:
Timeline, Origins and Founder, THESTREET (Aug. 17, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/
bitcoin/bitcoin-history-14686578; Matthew Braga, As Merchants Embrace Bitcoin, Digital Currency Still
Struggles for Regulatory Approval Worldwide, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/
2014/01/20/bitcoin-currency-merchants-regulators-2014/?lsa=592b-fc15.
11
See, e.g., Scott A. Wiseman, Note, Property or Currency? The Tax Dilemma Behind Bitcoin, 2016
UTAH L. REV. 417, 424 (2016); Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing
Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 380–81 (2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An
Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 164–65 (2012); Nikolei M.
Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 127–28 (2012).
12
JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS, 17–18 (2013); see also
Timothy B. Lee, An Illustrated History of Bitcoin Crashes, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013, 12:45 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/11/an-illustrated-history-of-bitcoin-crashes/; Aleksander Berentsen &
Fabian Schär, A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies, 100 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 1, 14
(2018).
13
Over the last twenty-five years, many scholarly articles have discussed different forms of central bank
e-money or Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), including various potential characteristics of such central
bank currency. See, e.g., Charles M. Kahn et al., Should the Central Bank Issue E-money?, (Bank of Can., Staff
Working Paper No. 2018-58, 2018). While articles discussing CBDC and central bank e-money will provide a
basis for much of the analysis here, such general terms also include digital currency, released by central banks
or governments in a variety of forms, many of which do not rely on cryptography. See id. at 3 (“Our definition
of central bank e-money is an electronic liability of the central bank, which might be held as a token or in an
account.”). This Comment will focus primarily on government-backed cryptocurrency, which would be initially
released by central banks or governments, but would rely on cryptography, Distributed Ledger Technology, and
blockchain. This focus more seamlessly permits extrapolation of lessons learned from regulation of private
cryptocurrency. See generally id.
14
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS 26 (Feb. 2015)
[hereinafter ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS].
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Governments have been slow,15 ineffective,16 and inconsistent in
implementing regulatory responses to private cryptocurrencies.17 As of May
2019, governments have managed to avoid such dangers, primarily because
private cryptocurrencies18 are not yet of significant enough heft to destabilize
the entire international monetary system.19 However, the European Central Bank
(ECB) posits that, “[t]he build-up of financial stability risks from [Virtual
Currency Schemes (VCS)] would be likely under the following conditions: (i)
VCS become more widely used in regular payments; (ii) greater links to the real
economy develop, including through the presence of financial institutions
participating in VCS … ”20
The biggest concern for government-backed cryptocurrencies is the potential
instability within the international economy and monetary system.21 Moving
forward, more countries will dip their toes into the waters, choosing either to
adopt their own, or another country’s government-backed cryptocurrency.22 And
while the international community has so far managed to avoid catastrophe,
government-backed cryptocurrencies pose a greater threat to the stability of the
international monetary system than do private cryptocurrencies.23 Governmentbacked cryptocurrencies have the potential to become fully integrated within the

15
See Braga, supra note 10; Bob Adelmann, Government Is Taking Steps to Regulate Bitcoin, NEW AM.
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/sectors/item/16985-government-is-taking-stepsto-regulate-bitcoin; Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 296–306 (2015).
16
See Anton Didenko & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Currency: Cash to Cryptos to Sovereign
Digital Currency, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (“In the case of Bitcoin and its spin-offs,
regulation has proven distinctly problematic for technical reasons: without a central server or a single operator,
it has been rather difficult to identify those to whom regulation should apply … Instead, the most popular
regulatory measure has taken the form of warnings concerning potential risks and—ironically—lack of proper
regulation. As the new privately issued digital currencies have kept multiplying, it was perhaps only a matter of
time before regulators would devise new strategies where regulation had thus far proven ineffective.”).
17
See generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR. AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 (surveying the approach to
regulation of private cryptocurrencies of 130 jurisdictions, with a wide swath of approaches being undertaken).
18
While not a widely used term, “private cryptocurrencies,” for purposes of this Comment, will refer to
those cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, and Ripple, so as to distinguish such cryptocurrencies from what
will be referred to as “government-backed cryptocurrencies.”
19
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
20
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26.
21
Veronika Rinecker, Gov’t-Issued Digital Currencies Threaten Financial Stability, Says Swiss Central
Banker, COIN TELEGRAPH (Apr. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/govt-issued-digital-currenciesthreaten-financial-stability-says-swiss-central-banker; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ANNUAL
ECONOMIC REPORT 100–01 (2018).
22
Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 52–53 (positing that while there may be hesitation on the part
of most nations in leaping into the unknown with respect to government-backed cryptocurrency, should a major
economy adopt such an official currency, other nations know they must respond in-kind).
23
See discussion infra Part II.B.; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
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international monetary system.24 This integration, combined with the lack of
oversight or system of best practices, governments and international
organizations ought to be acting with more urgency.25 Governments should
prioritize development of mechanisms to counter potential instability posed by
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency. Stability risks to
international systems are one of the most pressing issues facing governments
and governance organizations around the world.26
How should the global community address this concern of potential
instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrency? Is there one specific
organization which ought to “take the wheel” in coordinating a best practices
regime for government-backed cryptocurrency? Or is the current system, one in
which each country sets their own oversight framework, the best way to deal
with the potential instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrency to the
international monetary system?
Development of a cohesive and consistent international standard for best
practices will allow government-backed cryptocurrency to flourish, while
limiting the potential dangers posed to the international monetary system. The
organization best-equipped to handle international oversight of governmentbacked cryptocurrencies is the International Monetary Fund (IMF).27 The IMF
can provide protection to consumers, investors, and states by providing
legitimacy to these government-backed cryptocurrencies and by helping the
international community deal with the risks associated.28
This Comment justifies, in the context of private cryptocurrency regulatory
schemes, IMF leadership in developing an international framework of “best
practices” and proposes the IMF “pick up the pace” in creating such an oversight
framework.

24
Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, et al., Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency, 2018 IMF Staff
Discussion Note 18/08, 27.
25
See ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14.
26
As the ECB states, if virtual currency schemes become more widely adopted and are more directly
connected to the financial system, threats to financial stability will need to be addressed. Id. at 26 (“[A]s and
when these conditions are met to a larger extent, more direct regulatory responses might be required from
a financial stability perspective.”).
27
See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395–96 (discussing the primary purpose for the IMF and its role in the
global system of international exchange); see generally The IMF at a Glance, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm. The IMF was created primarily to: (1) “overcome
the collective action problem of allowing individual countries to enact self-interested economic policies without
jeopardizing the global economy” and (2) “ensure the stability of the international monetary system.” Plassaras,
supra note 11, at 393.
28
See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 404.
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Given that development of government-backed cryptocurrency is seemingly
in the initial stages, there are few real-life examples from which to draw upon.29
This Comment will look to the international regulatory treatment of private
cryptocurrencies, primarily using Bitcoin as an example, and evaluate the
approach that might best translate to oversight of government-backed
cryptocurrencies. However, this Comment will not assess the effectiveness of
current regulatory schemes in regulating private cryptocurrencies, nor proffer a
suggestion for which regulatory scheme best fits private cryptocurrencies. In
addition, this Comment will not address the potential implications of
government-backed cryptocurrencies for the future of private cryptocurrencies.
This Comment will begin in Part I by looking at the recent, widespread
interest in government-backed cryptocurrencies. Part I will also discuss the
threat posed to the stability of the international monetary system and the
existence of a framework (or lack-thereof) for oversight of government-backed
cryptocurrencies.
In Part II, this Comment will discuss private cryptocurrencies, focusing
specifically on Bitcoin, its characteristics, and the various regulatory schemes
currently in place around the world. Private cryptocurrencies do not fit neatly
into any one classification of regulated good.30 Examining the various
approaches to regulation of private cryptocurrency will help to determine
whether a parallel oversight framework can be applied to government-backed
cryptocurrencies.
In Part III, this Comment will identify the differences between private
cryptocurrencies and government cryptocurrencies, in an effort to identify which
limitation, or limitations, ought to be of primary concern.
In Part IV, this Comment will look to the global response to private cryptos
to provide some insight on how an oversight framework for government-backed
cryptocurrency might be devised. This Comment will then parse through the
globe’s stumbling attempts to regulate private cryptocurrencies,31 in hopes of
finding a solution to deal with the potential instability posed by the proliferation
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.

29

See infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
31
See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, All at
the Same Time, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION (forthcoming Oct. 2018) (discussing the overlapping regulatory
regimes and the unclear nature of what cryptocurrencies ought to be considered).
30
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Finally, this Comment will propose that the IMF take on efforts of
coordinating an international standard for best practices with greater urgency.
By proposing that such coordination and oversight fall under the purview of the
IMF, the international community can preemptively address one of the major
dangers arising from widespread adoption of government-backed
cryptocurrencies.
I.

INCREASED GOVERNMENT INTEREST

The dam is about to break in terms of widespread adoption of governmentbacked cryptocurrencies.32 In August 2018, Venezuela launched the Petro,
garnering media attention across the globe.33 It seemed to be a clear attempt to
capitalize on the “crypto-craze,” spurred by Bitcoin’s meteoric rise since early
2017.34 However, many investment analysts have been quick to criticize the
Petro as a clear scam.35 On the other hand, Sweden, Japan, and Estonia have all
contemplated the idea of releasing their own, more legitimate
cryptocurrencies.36
When Bitcoin first emerged into the mainstream, only a few countries (e.g.,
Brazil,37 Germany,38 and Canada39) were receptive to the idea of decentralized

32
See Qin Chen, Next Stop in the Cryptocurrency Craze: A Government-backed Coin, CNBC (Nov. 30,
2017, 8:41 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/cryptocurrency-craze-springboards-government-backedcoin.html; David Tweed, Why Governments Might Join the Cryptocurrency Craze, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-12/why-governments-might-join-the-cryptocurrency-crazequicktake; see also Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Winds of Change: The Case for
New Digital Currency, Address at the Singapore Fintech Festival 7 (Nov. 14, 2018).
33
See, e.g., Kate Rooney, Venezuela Is Pegging Its Economic Recovery to a Cryptocurrency That’s
Widely Considered a Scam, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/20/venezuelais-pegging-its-economic-recovery-to-a-cryptocurrency—thats-widely-considered-a-scam.html.
34
Chen, supra note 32; see also Hilary Hosia & Nick Perry, This Is the First Country to Adopt a
Cryptocurrency As Its Official Currency, TIME (Mar. 5, 2018), http://time.com/money/5186316/this-is-the-firstcountry-to-adopt-a-cryptocurrency-as-its-official-currency/ (“Bank of England Governor Mark Carney said this
past week that a global speculative mania had encouraged a proliferation of the currencies …. ‘[t]he prices of
many cryptocurrencies have exhibited the classic hallmarks of bubbles … reliant in part on finding the greater
fool.’”).
35
See, e.g., Rooney, supra note 33; George Richards, Why Governments Are Building Their Own
Cryptocurrencies, RACONTEUR (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.raconteur.net/finance/governments-buildingcryptocurrencies.
36
Chen, supra note 32.
37
Judith Lee et al., Bitcoin Basics: A Primer on Virtual Currencies, 16 BLI 21 (Jan. 2015).
38
Emily Spaven, Germany Officially Recognizes Bitcoin as “Private Coin,” COINDESK (Aug. 19, 2013),
https://www.coindesk.com/germany-official-recognises-bitcoin-as-private-money/.
39
See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 530–32 (2015) (citing Proceeds of Crime
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c 17, amended by S.C. 2014, c C-31 (Can.)).
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cryptocurrencies. Many were outright hostile (e.g., China40 and Thailand41),
while others merely waited for further developments.42 This attitude has shifted
drastically in the past four to five years.43 As of December 2018, a number of
governments,44 including Estonia,45 Japan,46 and the United States,47 have
expressed at least an interest in releasing their own, government-backed
cryptocurrencies. Other governments have gone farther, with some undertaking
research in anticipation of a release in the near future (e.g., Canada,48 Sweden49),
while others have already issued their own versions (e.g., Tunisia,50 Senegal,51
Dubai,52 the Marshall Islands,53 and Venezuela54).
Government interest in entering the cryptocurrency arena is motivated by a
number of factors, but is driven primarily by expected benefits such as lower

40
REUTERS, China is Shutting Down All of Beijing’s Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Exchanges, FORTUNE
(Sept. 15, 2017, 8:21 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/09/15/china-shutting-down-beijing-bitcoin-cryptocurrencyexchanges/; see also Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 512 (citing Virtual Currencies: International
Actions and Regulations, PERKINS COIE, http:// www.perkinscoie.com/virtual-currencies-international-actionsand-regulations (last updated June 2015)).
41
Virtual Currencies: International Actions and Regulations, PERKINS COIE, http://www.perkinscoie.
com/virtual-currencies-international-actions-and-regulations (last updated May 2019).
42
See GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 1 (Jan. 2014)
[hereinafter GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., SELECTED JURISDICTIONS] (“Of those countries surveyed, only a
few, notably China and Brazil, have specific regulations applicable to bitcoin use … [T]he debate over how to
deal with this new virtual currency is still in its infancy.”).
43
Compare id. (analyzing cryptocurrency regulation in forty select jurisdictions in 2014), with GLOB.
LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD., supra note 9 (analyzing government regulations of cryptocurrencies
in 130 jurisdictions in 2018).
44
See Mancini-Griffoli, et al., supra note 24, ¶ 54 (listing Australia, Brazil, China, Norway, Uruguay,
Canada, Curacao, Ecuador, Israel, United Kingdom, and the Philippines, among others, as countries that have
expressed interest in government-backed cryptocurrency).
45
Chen, supra note 32.
46
Arjun Kharpal, Japanese Banks are Thinking of Making Their Own Cryptocurrency Called the J-Coin,
CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017, 9:04 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/japanese-banks-cryptocurrency-j-coin.
html.
47
Jeff Cox, Federal Reserve Starting to Think About Its Own Digital Currency, Dudley Says, CNBC
(Nov. 29, 2017, 8:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/federal-reserve-starting-to-think-about-its-owndigital-currency-dudley-says.html.
48
See generally, Walter Engert & Ben S. C. Fung, Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and
Implications (Bank of Can. Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16, 2017).
49
SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT: REPORT 1 (Sept. 2017).
50
Stephen O’Neal, State-Issued Digital Currencies: The Countries Which Adopted, Rejected or
Researched the Concept, COIN TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/state-issued-digitalcurrencies-the-countries-which-adopted-rejected-or-researched-the-concept.
51
Id.
52
Samburaj Das, emCash is Dubai’s First Official State Cryptocurrency, CCN (Oct. 3, 2017, 1:57 PM),
https://www.ccn.com/emcash-dubais-first-official-state-cryptocurrency/.
53
Hosia & Perry, supra note 34.
54
Rooney, supra note 33.
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transaction costs,55 the potential for further financial inclusion,56 and the secure
“public ledger.”57 At the same time, governments have made it clear for years
that a move towards digital is near, given the global environment and shifting
attitude away from physical cash.58 Finally, one of the likely59 driving forces
behind the interest in government-backed cryptocurrencies is the extensive news
coverage of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.60
A. Greater Financial Inclusion Means More Extensive Integration of
Government-backed Crypto Into the International Monetary System
Governments considering adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency
frequently cite the potential that such technology provides for greater financial
inclusion.61 Lower transaction costs are a significant contributing factor in
government-backed cryptocurrencies’ potential for financial inclusion.62
Another contributing factor is the implicit trust associated with a medium of
exchange backed by the government/central bank.63 Finally, elimination of the
requirement for a trusted third-party intermediary not only contributes to lower
55
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, 21 (Oct. 2012), [hereinafter ECB, VIRTUAL
CURRENCY SCHEMES] (“[T]ransactions are carried out faster and more cheaply than with traditional means of
payment. Transactions fees, if any, are very low and no bank account fee is charged.”).
56
See discussion infra Part II.A.
57
Jason Abbruzzese, What Happens When Governments Get into Cryptocurrency, MASHABLE (Jan. 8,
2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/08/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-governments/#YjtOaApmjaq4.
58
See IMF, Republic of the Marshall Islands: 2018 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Rep. No.
18/270 (Sept. 2018) [hereinafter Republic of the Marshall Islands]; SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49;
Lagarde, supra note 32 (“[M]oney itself is changing. We expect it to become more convenient and user-friendly,
perhaps even less serious-looking. We expect it to be integrated with social media, readily available for online
and person-to-person use, including micro-payments.”).
59
It seems prescient to note that this is my own opinion. The applications of blockchain technology
beyond Bitcoin are plentiful and diverse, as outlined in numerous articles. See, e.g., Crosby, supra note 8.
However, cryptocurrencies have captured most of the attention of news outlets and the average consumer.
Charles Bovaird, Top 5 Factors Driving Bitcoin Higher This Year, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2017, 4:37 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2017/12/22/top-5-factors-driving-bitcoin-higher-thisyear/#2d3d685461a9. Governments have latched onto this enthusiasm and put forth proposals centered primarily
on cryptocurrencies, as opposed to proposals focused on the other aspects of the underlying technology. See,
e.g., Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 2144, 116th Cong. (2019).
60
Bovaird, supra note 59.
61
See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the
implementation of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion); Lagarde, supra note 32 (“Let
me start with financial inclusion, where digital currency offers great promise, through its ability to reach people
and businesses in remote and marginalized regions.”).
62
This includes distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain technology. For further discussion
of these technologies, see Crosby, supra note 8.
63
See Plassaras, supra note 11, 383 n. 25 (2013) (citing ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note
55, at 9–10) (“Users are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services simply because they trust this
central authority.).
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transaction fees (meaning greater financial inclusion),64 but also allows
consumers to take one fewer step to enter the “mainstream” structured financial
system.65
Potential risks to the international financial system must be addressed in a
proactive manner, especially in light of the expectation that government-backed
cryptocurrency will lead to greater financial inclusion.66 Greater financial
integration will allow such government-backed digital currency to account for
substantially more of the value of the international monetary system.67 As
government-backed cryptocurrency comes to represent a greater portion of the
international monetary system, potential instability will become more pressing
and represent a bigger risk to the international monetary system.68 The
international community must deal with the risks associated with such
integration before they present a major problem.
B. The Threat to Stability
Due to the cross-border reach of cryptocurrencies, “the actions of one
country that buys and sells cryptocurrency to control its availability could have
a destabilizing effect on other economies that also widely use that
cryptocurrency; in this way, one country’s approach to cryptocurrency could
undermine price stability or exacerbate recessions or overheating in another
country.”69 Other risks to financial stability are posed by widely-adopted digital
currency.70 Per the IMF themselves, there are at least two scenarios which need
to be considered as dangers to the stability of the financial system (1) “Risk of
Disintermediation in Tranquil Times,” and (2) “Run Risks in Times of
Systematic Financial Stress.”71 Such effects are only increased when there is
64

Brito, supra note 12, at 10–13.
See Joshua J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin
Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2013) (“While third parties, like central banks and financial
intermediaries, often perform valuable services in regulating and transferring currency, their presence in the
system increases the cost of using it …. In this context, cost is used in a broad sense not only to include the
increased financial expense of the system, but also the inconvenience and uncertainty that it entails.”).
66
See, e.g., Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing that part of the case for central bank digital currency is
the potential for greater financial inclusion of people and businesses in remote and marginalized regions);
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the implementation
of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion).
67
See hypothetical supra Part I.
68
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
69
David W. Perkins, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues,
Congressional Research Service 22 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45427.pdf.
70
See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶¶ 38–50 (discussing the potential effect CBDC could have
on financial stability in a domestic context).
71
Id.; see also Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing the downsides of “Bank Digital Currencies,” including
65
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further integration of government-backed cryptocurrencies into the monetary
system.
Financial instability within the system could also begin with a speculative
attack on the value of a currency.72 Speculative attacks can be undertaken by
international actors, for a number of purposes, but if successful, such attacks
would cause substantial instability within the international monetary system.73
One purpose of the IMF is to help counter such speculative attacks if needed, by
fluctuating the money supply.74
Hidden in the background is one of the biggest threats to stability—the
“Herding Effect.”75 The premise of the “Herding Effect” is that if one
government-backed cryptocurrency becomes the dominant form of electronic
payment, other countries will want to “get in on the action.”76 Governments that
fail to develop the technology quickly will risk the loss of “monetary
sovereignty,” something of vital importance to the legitimacy of government
itself.77
C. The Lack of International Response
The response of regulators, commentators, and investors to the proposition
of government-backed cryptocurrency has been a mix of curiosity and

the potential risks to financial stability presented by pressure on bank deposits and the possibility of bank runs).
72
For an in-depth discussion of these potential speculative attacks in the context of Bitcoin, see Nicholas
A. Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377. While Plassaras’ discussion is in the context of Bitcoin, “[a]ny other digital
currency that enters widespread use would pose similar problems.” Id. at 380.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 52–53
76
“[O]ne of the biggest possible challenges stems from the herding effect that may result from the
adoption of a disintermediated state-backed official currency by a major economy, like the US. The utility of an
official medium of exchange digitally available to end-users without any intermediaries is hard to overestimate—
such a currency could quickly become a dominant medium of exchange in international transactions, without
meaningful ways for other states to regulate it, since the underlying technology easily penetrates national
boundaries. One possible response for other states in this scenario could be the development of their own
competing sovereign digital currencies and their promotion for internal use. This could explain, at least in part,
why so many national regulators have expressed interest in devising a new sovereign currency … many nations
recognise that should a credible major country issue a sovereign digital currency, it may offer considerable
advantages over regular currency in the first-mentioned nation’s jurisdiction, and so the nation could rapidly
face the loss of both monetary sovereignty and of the data associated with the use of the sovereign digital
currency which will be collected by the issuing sovereign abroad, not the nation within which it is being used.
Only time will tell the answer, but for now one question remains: which country will be the first to throw down
the gauntlet in the sovereign digital currency battle?” Id.
77
See id.
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skepticism.78 Central banks engaged in research to determine the potential
effects on that specific country and its population have been the primary
participants in the discussion of government-backed cryptocurrency.79 A few
governments have taken the view that, while private cryptocurrencies may create
issues, the market for such digital assets is “too small to [cause] sufficient
concern [that] warrant[s] regulation and/or a ban at this juncture.”80
The first official analysis to emerge from an international organization was
an annual IMF Article IV81 consultation for the Marshall Islands, in September
2018.82 The IMF report was relatively skeptical of the Marshall Island’s
proposed cryptocurrency, the SOV.83 The IMF expressed concerns about the
interaction between cryptocurrencies and AML/CFT regulations,84 concerns
which would arise with any government-backed cryptocurrency should it look
anything like Bitcoin.85 However, such concerns were amplified given the
circumstances and regulatory concerns already present in the Marshall Islands.86
Two months later, in November 2018, the IMF released a Staff Discussion
Note entitled “Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency,” thereby
bringing oversight of government-backed cryptocurrency into the international
78

See, e.g., Rooney, supra note 33; Chen, supra note 32.
See, e.g., SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49.
80
GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 2; see also Kahn et al., supra note 13,
at 1, 4; discussion infra Part IV.B.
81
An Article IV consultation stems from the requirement imposed on IMF member countries by Article
IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 4, adopted
July 22, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; see also Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY
FUND https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (“Country surveillance is an
ongoing process that culminates in regular (usually annual) comprehensive consultations with individual
member countries, with discussions in between as needed. The consultations are known as ‘Article IV
consultations’ because they are required by Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. During an Article IV
consultation, an IMF team of economists visits a country to assess economic and financial developments and
discuss the country’s economic and financial policies with government and central bank officials. IMF staff
missions also often meet with parliamentarians and representatives of business, labor unions, and civil society.”).
82
Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 58.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies—Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, 1, 9
(2014) [hereinafter FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies]; see also PERKINS COIE, supra note 40
(containing a chart showing actions by many national governments); Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at
530–32.
86
Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 58. The Marshall Islands is “a small and remote country
… with a dispersed population,” with an economy highly dependent on external aid. Id. ¶ 1. Furthermore, the
Marshall Islands already has an issue complying with U.S. Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering
requirements for accounts denominated in U.S. dollars. Id. ¶ 10. As discussed later in this Comment,
government-backed cryptocurrency presents due diligence issues, even for countries currently implementing
high levels of due diligence.
79
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conversation.87 The IMF analysis in this Staff Discussion Note was far more indepth than in the Marshall Islands’ Article IV Report. The analysis focused on
possible Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) designs, as well as the potential
advantages and disadvantages of government-backed cryptocurrency.88 While
extremely insightful when compared to alternative works available at the time,
this Staff Discussion Note explicitly “abstract[ed] from cross-border
considerations by assuming that [government-backed cryptocurrency] is for
domestic use only.”89 Limiting analysis within the domestic context is puzzling
given the borderless characteristics of digital currencies, and is insufficient when
measured against the dangers presented by cross-border transactions involving
government-backed cryptocurrencies.
The international community has exhibited a surprising lack of urgency in
determining the potential consequences and reverberations stemming from
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency.90 Exemplifying
this insufficiently urgent attitude, the IMF Staff Discussion Note stated,
“Overall, it is too early to draw firm conclusions on the net benefits of
CBDC. Central banks should consider their specific country circumstances,
paying careful attention to the risks and relative merits of alternative
solutions. Further analysis of technological feasibility and operational costs
is needed.”91
The IMF’s attitude toward development of an international system of best
practices, exemplified by the above quote, is not an isolated notion. In 2015, the
European Central Bank advised that if virtual currencies became more connected
to the real international economic system, the international community would
need to more seriously undertake a comprehensive oversight framework.92 The
time for issuing warnings has passed given the increased interest by government
in introducing their own cryptocurrencies.93 The world must take decisive action
87

Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at 6. The IMF was the first major international organization to
address this issue head-on. Id. The organization did not release a substantive paper until November 2018; this
first major international analysis of central bank digital currency only evaluated such currencies with respect to
their domestic application, as opposed to analyzing the international effects. Id.
91
Id. at 5; see also id. at 31 (“Research on CBDC should proceed resolutely given that the questions to
be explored are deep and difficult and have far-reaching implications.”).
92
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26 (“An increase in
the usage of VCS is conceivable and thus surveillance of the take-up of VCS is important from a financial
stability perspective. Transparency as regards the number, structure and scope of VCS appears key for
monitoring such developments.”).
93
Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 3 (resulting from the potential danger for large-scale instability
88
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to coordinate development of a coherent, international oversight framework or
system of best practices to deal with the potential consequences of governmentbacked cryptocurrency. While it may not seem as though any one nation is close
to introducing a legitimate government-backed cryptocurrency, the “Herding
Effect,” lurks beneath the surface.94 The “Herding Effect,” in conjunction with
the above-referenced warning issued by the European Central Bank, should
further spur governments to undertake specific actions which may preempt
issues of financial instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrencies.
Given government-backed cryptocurrencies’ integration potential, and the
subsequent issues that may arise, the international community must adopt some
form of oversight or established best practices as soon as possible.95 While a
country-by-country approach may allow for more freedom of choice for each
individual government and eventually result in a sufficient level of concern,96 a
single agency is much better equipped to tackle such pressing matters.97
Furthermore, if a single agency is the force pushing countries to adopt a system
of “best practices,” there will be the additional benefits conveyed by having a
uniform approach to oversight across jurisdictions.98 A single agency must take
the lead in creating and enforcing an international scheme of oversight relating
to government-backed cryptocurrencies—at least as a starting point.
Given the issues, discussed below in Part III.B, that private cryptocurrencies
currently present to governments around the world, the lack of an urgent
response to the dangers of government-backed cryptocurrencies should not
come as a surprise. 99
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE PRO-ACTIVE, DRAWING
LESSONS FROM CURRENT EFFORTS TO REGULATE PRIVATE CRYPTOCURRENCY
National governments have failed to address regulatory concerns
surrounding private cryptocurrencies.100 Countries have opted to implement new
regulatory schemes haphazardly, or to adapt existing regulatory schemes to
within the international monetary system).
94
Id. at 52–53.
95
See supra Part II.B (discussing some of the ways in which the international monetary system might be
destabilized).
96
Sufficient with respect to the size of the threat posed by the government-backed cryptocurrency space
without oversight.
97
See infra Part V.B.
98
See infra Part III.D.
99
See infra Part II.C.
100
See Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 3.
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private cryptocurrencies.101 And yet, while private cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin have been discussed ad-nauseum,102 there is still no dominant approach
to regulation.103
A number of factors contribute to this lack of regulatory clarity. Part of this
is attributable to the evolving nature of the space.104 Another part may be that
existing laws often are not drafted with future technological advancements in
mind.105 Thus, attempts to regulate innovative products or technologies are often
unclear.106 Another significant factor contributing to the muddled regulatory
environment for private cryptocurrencies is a result of the piece-meal approach
taken by individual countries.107 However, the unique characteristics of private
cryptocurrencies are the biggest contributing factor to this slow regulatory
development.108 In an attempt to minimize the negative impact(s) which they
perceive most harmful, states have taken a wide range of regulatory approaches.
A. What are Private Cryptocurrencies, and Specifically, What is Bitcoin?
Cryptocurrencies, both private and government-backed, represent a
relatively new technology.109 Cryptocurrencies are decentralized, peer-to-peer
virtual currencies operating on a cryptographic network.110 These coins are
“digital representations of value and can be transferred, stored, and traded
101

See Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 296–306.
See generally supra note 11.
103
Compare Plassaras, supra note 11 (proposing regulation of Bitcoin under the IMF), with Howden,
supra note 5, at 765 (rejecting regulation under the IMF and countering with WTO regulation) and Hughes &
Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 530–32 (asserting that cryptocurrencies ought to be regulated as systems of
payment).
104
Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 296.
105
Id. at 305.
106
Id. at 304–05.
107
This only makes sense; when a large number of intelligent people, from a variety of cultures and
backgrounds, look at a problem, they will likely come up with various solutions to the problem. Lack of
experience in the crypto space by regulators leads to experimentation in how the issues arising from cryptos are
handled. Given the novelty of the technology, it will take time for the dominant regulatory scheme to emerge.
108
See infra Part III.B.
109
Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 2 (reasoning that while theorization of decentralized, private currency has
been prevalent in Austrian School of Economics circles for many years, the technology blockchain and
distributed ledger technology (DLT) and usage of such technology is a relatively recent development); See, e.g.,
Cole Peterson, Lack of Widespread Crypto Knowledge Could be Stunting the Market’s Growth, NEWSBTC (Dec.
21, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/12/21/lack-of-widespread-crypto-knowledge-could-be-stunting-themarkets-growth/ (concluding that given the novelty of the technology itself, cryptocurrencies are a topic on
which many people have only the most basic understanding). While this may prove to be sufficient for
discussions at the workplace water-cooler, the substantive law of this Comment may prove more informative if
the base technology of cryptocurrencies is explored at more than surface-level.
110
Tal Yellin et al., What is Bitcoin, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-isbitcoin/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
102
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electronically.”111 Cryptocurrencies fall within the broader category of digital
currencies,112 as illustrated by Figure 1 below. There are currently hundreds of
cryptocurrencies in circulation, each with distinct characteristics and
applications.113 The most popular and well-known of these cryptocurrencies is
Bitcoin, while both Ethereum and XRP have seen relatively recent success.114

115

As the most widespread and well-known cryptocurrency, a broad-strokes
background of cryptocurrency necessarily begins with Bitcoin.116 In 2009,
Satoshi Nakamoto released a whitepaper in which he detailed how his
cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, had solved, via a decentralized network, the doublespend problem previously encountered by virtual currencies.117 The doublespend problem, was one of the main roadblocks to previous iterations of digital
currency.118 Before Bitcoin, online transactions always required trusted thirdparties to facilitate, because:
[w]ithout such intermediaries, digital money could be spent twice. Imagine there are no intermediaries with ledgers, and digital cash is
simply a computer file, just as digital documents are computer files.

111

Lee et al., supra note 37.
IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/16/03,
¶ 9 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter Virtual Currencies and Beyond].
113
Coinmarket provides a listing of the most recognized cryptocurrencies. See All Cryptocurrencies,
COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ (last visited July 16, 2019) [hereinafter
COINMARKETCAP].
114
See id. (listing of all cryptocurrencies sorted by market cap in USD from highest to lowest).
115
Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 9.
116
See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 113.
117
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1 (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
118
See Nakamoto, supra note 117; see also Crosby, supra note 8, at 10; Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and
Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/.
112
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Alice could send $100 to Bob by attaching a money file to a message.
But just as with email, sending an attachment does not remove it from
one’s computer. Alice would retain a copy of the money file after she
had sent it. She could then easily send the same $100 to Charlie.119

The solution which Bitcoin implemented was to distribute,
the necessary ledger among all the users of the system via a peer-topeer network. Every transaction that occurs in the bitcoin economy is
registered in a public, distributed ledger, which is called the block
chain. New transactions are checked against the block chain to ensure
that the same bitcoins haven’t been previously spent, thus eliminating
the double-spending problem.120

This solution is one of the primary reasons that Bitcoin was considered a
break-through for decentralized digital currency.121 From 2009 to early 2012,
Bitcoin remained relatively unknown, its use primarily confined amongst a small
number of internet users.122 However, between 2013 and 2014, Bitcoin (and
other cryptocurrencies) came to the forefront via the Silk Road123 investigation
and the Mt. Gox scandal.124 Since 2012, a number of agencies in countries such
as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, among others, have proposed a
broad spectrum of regulatory schemes to help protect participants in the crypto-

119

Brito, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. at 4.
121
Crosby, supra note 8 at 16 (concluding that without the adoption of this feature, Bitcoin would have
been destined to fall victim to many of the same issues presented by previous attempts to create decentralized,
digital money—the potential fraud arising from counterfeiting, that without a trusted third-party could not be
reined in, thus rendering the “money” unreliable and ultimately useless); see also Brito, supra note 12, at 3
(“Until Bitcoin’s invention in 2008 by the unidentified programmer known as Satoshi Nakamoto, online
transactions always required a trusted third-party intermediary.”).
122
Brito, supra note 12, at 3; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 172–74 (stating that other users included early
adopters, gold bugs, and those individuals who “believe that central banking institutions that have the authority
to print more money, like the Federal Reserve, corrupt the economy and therefore they do not trust governmentbacked fiat currencies (those unredeemable for commodities). Accordingly, these individuals prefer to hold their
wealth and make exchanges in currencies backed by commodities—usually gold.”).
123
Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 126 (“Silk Road, an online black-market website, also takes advantage of
bitcoin’s anonymity to sell mail-order illegal drugs and weapons. They made bitcoins the only form of payment
on the website since other forms of payment, like PayPal or credit cards, can be traced or blocked.”).
124
Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bites on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating
Fraud in the E-conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 185 (2013); Robert McMillan,
The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.
wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/; see also Anita Ramasastry, Bitcoin: If You Can’t Ban It, Should You
Regulate It? The Merits of Legalization, JUSTIA VERDICT (Feb. 25, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/
02/25/bitcoin-cant-ban-regulate#sthash.4oUpDzhi.dpuf.
120
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asset space.125 However, no single approach garnered particularly widespread
consensus on the international stage.126
When Bitcoin began its slow rise in value starting in late 2013,127 it became
apparent that governments would begin to take greater interest in regulating
these coins.128 Some states took this a step further, raising the possibility of
issuing, and regulating, their own cryptocurrencies, in an attempt to enter the
digital currency space.129 As Bitcoin began to skyrocket in late 2017,130 so did
government interest in the possibility of creating government-backed
cryptocurrency.131
This Comment will use academic and central bank studies, as well as various
other literature surrounding Bitcoin to identify potential challenges posed by
government-backed cryptocurrency.132 Lessons learned from attempts to
regulate Bitcoin will subsequently be applied in order to propose viable solutions
for dealing with the limitations of government-backed cryptocurrencies.
B. What are The Characteristics of Private Cryptocurrencies?
Cryptocurrencies in general, and Bitcoin in particular, have gained
popularity over the last 5 years.133 The main advantages over traditional fiat
currency134 can be grouped into four categories: (1) the ability to operate without
125
See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938; Letter from Mary Jo White, to Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/VCurrenty111813.pdf; US Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Crimes and Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using
Virtual Currencies” (Regulatory Guidance, FIN-2013-G001, US Dep’t of the Treasury, Washington, DC, March
18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN].
126
PERKINS COIE, supra note 40; see generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note
9, at 1.
127
See Fiorillo, supra note 10.
128
See e.g., FINCEN, supra note 125.
129
See supra Part II.
130
Fiorillo, supra note 10.
131
See supra Part II.
132
The discussion surrounding government-backed cryptocurrency is largely theoretical, consisting
primarily of central bank studies and pilot programs. Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Intro. While
government interest has increased greatly, the most widespread and most studied cryptocurrency is Bitcoin. See
Michael Bordo & Andrew Levin, Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy 1 (Hoover
Insitution Economics Working Paper No. 17104, Aug. 2017).
133
GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 1.
134
“Fiat money is any legal tender designated and issued by a central authority, such as the dollar or euro.
It is similar to commodity-backed money in appearance, but radically different in concept, as it can no longer
by redeemed for a commodity like gold. Users are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services simply
because they trust this central authority. Trust is therefore a crucial element of any fiat money system.” Plassaras,
supra note 11, at 383 n. 25 (citing ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 55, at 9–10).
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a trusted third-party;135 (2) lower transaction costs;136 (3) a secure “public
ledger” (e.g., the blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin provides this
security);137 and (4) pseudo-anonymity.138
Some of these benefits are central to the idea of decentralized139
cryptocurrencies,140 and would likely be diminished or eliminated entirely in
creating a government-backed cryptocurrency.141 Other features—e.g.,
primarily the lower transaction costs and the secure “public ledger”—are
benefits inherent to blockchain-based coins, meaning they would translate over
to government-backed cryptocurrencies.142
While private cryptocurrencies offer important advantages, they also have
significant drawbacks. Some of the major problems associated with private
cryptocurrencies are: (1) a lack of price stability;143 (2) a lack of inherent
value;144 (3) security concerns with respect to storage of cryptocurrencies;145 (4)

135

Lee et al., supra note 37, at
Howden, supra note 5; see also, Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24 (discussing the potential benefits
of digital currency, of which greater financial integration and lower transaction costs are two mentioned).
137
See Lee et al., supra note 37, at 2; see also Wiseman, supra note 11, at 8.
138
Lee et al., supra note 37, at 2. Some publications mistakenly describe Bitcoin as an anonymous
payment system. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 11, at 204 (“Digital currencies are attractive vehicles for money
laundering because they allow fast, anonymous, through-the-Internet transfers.”). Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous
because of the public and private key technology. For more information on Bitcoin’s usage of public and private
keys, and the relationship of this technology with pseudo-anonymity of Bitcoin users, see generally Francois R.
Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter No. 317, at 2–3 (Dec.
2013).
139
For purposes of this Comment, all private cryptocurrencies will be presumed decentralized, while
government-backed cryptocurrencies will be presumed to be centralized. While potentially interesting and
relevant, expanding the scope of this Comment to include such information would muddle all discussion. For
further discussion of the nuance surrounding centralized and decentralized digital currencies, see generally
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24 at 7–9; Kahn et al., supra note 13.
140
See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 12 at 15–16 (referencing security benefits [tangentially]).
141
One of the “benefits,” anonymity (or at least pseudo-anonymity), would almost certainly disappear.
Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team, Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?,
BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/central-bank-digital-currencycbdc/; see also, JP Koning, Fedcoin: A Central Bank-issued Cryptocurrency, R3 (Nov. 2016), https://www.r3.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/fedcoin_central-bank_R3.pdf.
142
Noelle Acheson, Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/why-usebitcoin/ (last updated Feb. 29, 2014).
143
Brito, supra note 12; see also, Lee, supra note 12; Berentsen & Schär, supra note 12, at 14.
144
Velde, supra note 138, at 2–3.
145
Brito, supra note 12, at 19.
136
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the effect of pseudo-anonymity on criminal activity;146 and (5) the lack of
developed consumer or merchant protections from fraudulent transactions.147
One of the most unique characteristics of private cryptocurrencies is the
ability to transfer coins across borders. The Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) aptly summarizes the concept:
Cross Border Reach. Digital currencies based on distributed ledgers
are basically open networks with a global scope. These schemes do not
distinguish between users based on location, and therefore allow value
to be transferred between users across borders. Moreover, the speed of
a transaction is not conditional on the location of the payer and payee.
Further, in the context of restrictions that may be placed on cross-border transactions by national authorities, the decentralized nature of
these digital currency schemes means that it is difficult to impose such
restrictions on transactions.148

While this characteristic in and of itself is not a disadvantage, and some
would argue it is an advantage, the “cross-border reach” of private
cryptocurrencies can be a complicating factor in promulgating regulation.149
Given the lack of real-world experience with government-backed
cryptocurrencies, one way to predict their potential risks, and provide solutions
to such risks, is to analyze the current regulatory schemes for private
cryptocurrencies.
C. Current Cryptocurrency Regulatory Schemes
Private cryptocurrencies fall in what could best be described as a regulatory
gray area.150 The technology associated with private cryptocurrencies is unique
146
Brito, supra note 12, at 20–22; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies, supra note 85; see also,
Ramasastry, supra note 124 (“Bitcoins, because they are not widely regulated or under government scrutiny, are
used for illegal purposes.”).
147
See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 168–70 (“Bitcoin has no built-in anti-fraud capabilities, whereas
companies like PayPal have invested millions of dollars in protecting customers against fraud.”).
148
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (BIS), COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES,
DIGITAL CURRENCIES, 1, 10 (Nov. 2015).
149
See ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26. (“As and when
these conditions are met to a larger extent, more direct regulatory responses might be required from a financial
stability perspective. Moreover, regulatory responses are likely to be more effective if they are internationally
coordinated. A patchwork of inconsistent national-level regulatory responses to financial stability concerns may
not address risks—as the activity of agents in this market may be international.”); see also infra Part IV.D
(discussing NYDFS).
150
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 182. See, for example, the tax law treatment of cryptocurrencies around the
world. GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 2–3; see generally Goforth, supra note
31, at 2.
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and could not have been, nor was it, anticipated by lawmakers.151 Private
cryptocurrencies exhibit traits of securities, systems of payment, commodities,
and currencies,152 as well as the catch-all phrase “digital assets.”153 As a result,
private cryptocurrencies, can be, and often are, placed into four different
regulatory “buckets,” each of which is a different regulatory framework
governing financial assets with different characteristics.154
Consequently, there are at least four unique regulatory schemes which
parallel the different “classifications.”155 These four regulatory schemes attempt
to regulate private cryptocurrencies as: securities, a system of payment,
commodities, and currency. A broad overview of these regulatory schemes, and
the reasoning behind their application to Bitcoin/private cryptocurrencies, will
provide important insight into a potentially workable framework for oversight
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.156
The current system of regulation differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
is an incoherent mess.157 The resulting “infrastructure” is destructive towards
the currencies themselves, and dangerous for both individual users, as well as
the societies in which such currency usage is prevalent.158
1. Cryptocurrencies as Securities
The first regulatory scheme treats private cryptocurrencies as securities.159
While many of the early adopters of Bitcoin invested because they believed in
the idea and the tech, they also saw it as an investment opportunity.160 Bitcoins,
151

Compare VoIP to cryptocurrencies. See Brito, supra note 12, at 23–24.
Brito, supra note 12, at 22–23.
153
Howden, supra note 5, at 767.
154
See generally, Goforth, supra note 31.
155
See generally, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9.
156
For a more in-depth discussion of certain regulatory schemes, on a country-by-country basis, see GLOB.
LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9.
157
Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y, TIMES DEALBOOK (June 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/crypto-industry-regulation.html.
158
Id.; see generally, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 (providing a survey of
the regulatory responses of 130 countries and illustrating the lack of consistency in, not only regulatory schemes,
but even terminology).
159
This is the approach taken by the SEC, which treats Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) as investment
contracts under the Howey test. See e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
160
Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 14–15; see also, Grinberg, supra note 11, at 165; Joe Light, Should You
Invest in Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2013, 10:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-invest-inbitcoin-1385161664; Bill Bambrough, Canadian Central Bank Bitcoin Survey Reveals Worrying Crypto Trends,
FORBES (July 12, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/07/12/bitcoin-surveyreveals-worrying-crypto-trends/#361c67422cf2.
152
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as with most other private cryptocurrencies, are speculative investments and
their usefulness does not extend beyond a small group of people looking to make
passive gains via their investments.161
In SEC v. W. J. Howey, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an investment
contract has four parts.162 These four requirements are typically found in private
cryptocurrencies and the early case law in the United States supported such a
contention.163 This approach was mirrored by a number of other governments.164
Under a regulatory system in which private cryptocurrencies are classified
as securities, domestic authority would lie with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),165 or a similar regulatory agency, such as the Canadian
Securities Agency (CSA).166 This would provide a federal infrastructure for
regulation of cryptocurrencies. However, this regulatory approach has been
challenged by both academics167 and the courts,168 leading to speculation that
certain cryptocurrencies, once usage is prevalent among a sufficiently large
population, may no longer fall under the purview of securities regulators.169
Alternatively, cryptocurrencies could be regulated on a state-by-state basis
under the “Blue Sky” laws, or a comparable scheme abroad.170 The issue faced
in a state-by-state regulatory regime is the cross-border reach of Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies, which is only magnified at this level of intranational
regulation.171 Private cryptocurrencies are able to maneuver across boundaries

161

See generally Bambrough, supra note 156.
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (describing requirements for an investment
contract).These four requirements are: (1) an investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; (3) an expectation
of profits; and (4) profits derived from the efforts of others. Id.
163
Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *4–*6.
164
See, e.g., CSA Staff Notice 46-307—Cryptocurrency Offerings, SN 46-307/2017 (Can.), available at
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.htm; Initial Coin Offers,
FMA, https://www.fma.govt.nz/compliance/cryptocurrencies/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
165
See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 at 10–15 (July 25, 2017).
166
See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 11.
167
See Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce: The Case for Private
Currencies On the Internet, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 733, 747 n.49 (1998); see also Grinberg, supra note 11, at
196–99.
168
SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200773, at *20 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 27, 2018).
169
William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit:
Crypto (June 14, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.
170
Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/
answers-blueskyhtm.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
171
See supra Part III.B (discussing the cross-border reach of cryptocurrency).
162
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unlike any other financial instrument anticipated by current regulations.172 This
method of regulating is likely to raise a number of questions and problems,
which may confound users and regulators.173 Furthermore, this state-by-state
approach does not address the haphazard results which may occur from differing
regulatory schemes.
The final, and most attractive, option under a securities regulatory scheme is
regulation on an international scale. However, securities are not currently
regulated on an international level and there is no entity with the clear capability
or drive to undertake such a regulatory scheme.174 The closest institution to one
which regulates securities on an international basis is the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.175 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is “the
primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks …. ”176
However, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is not a binding legal
authority and its decisions do not have legal force on their own, meaning the
members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are relied upon to
enforce the decisions.177 While the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
provides a forum for different governments to discuss and address “regulatory
and supervisory gaps that pose risks to financial stability,” the lack of binding
authority, presents issues in coordinating the creation of an oversight
framework, as countries will presumably be more resistant to outside forces—
which are essentially advisory boards—dictating their monetary policy.178
2. Cryptocurrencies as a System of Payment
There has been an interesting debate surrounding whether private
cryptocurrencies fall under the category of “systems of payment.”179 Given the
nature of cryptocurrencies, some experts have put forth the idea that an obvious
way to regulate private cryptocurrencies is to treat them as payment system.180
Other scholars, however, have argued that Bitcoin is clearly not a system of

172

Brito, supra note 12, at 22–23.
See Hughes & Middlebrook supra, note 39 at 540–41.
174
Howden, supra note 5, at 765.
175
Id. at 765–66; see also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision–Overview, BIS, http://www.bis.org/
bcbs/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter BIS, Digital Currencies].
176
Id.
177
Id. While the IMF is also not a “binding” authority, the historical importance of the IMF in maintaining
the stability of the international monetary system for more than eighty years lends significant authority to its
decisions. See infra note 237.
178
Basel Committee Charter, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).
179
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 17.
180
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39.
173

GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20

618

3/25/2020 4:16 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

payment, given that a bitcoin user may make a person-to-person transaction or
a person-to-business transaction without requiring an intermediary or third party
to verify the validity of the transaction.181
Meanwhile, proponents argue that private cryptocurrencies are systems of
payment which may operate free of a third-party. Further, such proponents
stress, private cryptocurrencies function in a much more flexible manner than
most other systems of payment.182 However, payment systems are subject to a
number of different regulations around the world, most prominent of which are
anti-money laundering laws (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism
(CFT).183 Notwithstanding these concerns, some governments continue to
classify cryptocurrencies as a means of payment.184
While an in-depth dive of such regulations is outside the scope of this
Comment, there is some basic information required before evaluating regulation
of cryptocurrencies under this regulatory scheme. AML/CFT regulations vary
by country,185 thus the Australian AML/CTF Act will serve as an example of
such regulations. One of the main obligations placed upon reporting entities is
Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements and verification of identity.186 This
obligation’s purpose is to “ensure the reporting entity knows its customers and
understands their customers’ financial activities.”187 These obligations are
universal with respect to many national AML/CFT statutes188 and international
standards.189

181

Id. at 518.
Id. at 539–42.
183
Id. at 517–22; see also FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION [hereinafter FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS].
184
See, e.g., GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing the few
jurisdictions that allow cryptocurrencies to function as a means of payment, even by government agencies).
185
See generally Concepcion Verdugo Yepes, Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard:
Lessons from a Cross-Country Analysis (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/11/177, 2011).
186
See Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) pt 2 div 4 s 29 (Austl.);
see also, Part B of an AML/CTF Program (Customer Due Diligence Procedures), AUSTRAC, http://www.
austrac.gov.au/part-b-amlctf-program-customer-due-diligence-procedures (last updated July 1, 2019).
187
Part B of an AML/CTF Program (Customer Due Diligence Procedures), supra note 186. The
Australian government requires that a reporting entity is “reasonably satisfied that: an individual customer is
who they claim to be [and] a customer who is not an individual (such as a company, association, or trust) is a
real entity and [they] know the details of its beneficial owners.” Id.
188
See, e.g., Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17
amended by S.C. 2014, c C-31 (Can.).
189
The FATF is an intergovernmental agency which promotes international standards on combating
money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS,
supra note 183.
182
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Under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the Department of the Treasury
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the entity responsible for
regulating systems of payment with operations in the United States.190 The BSA
and its regulatory requirements were enacted by Congress primarily to “prevent
illegal activity by requiring that regulated entities assist with the identification
and investigation of suspicious transactions and customers.”191 The regulatory
requirements of the BSA impose four main requirements on financial
institutions: “(1) report[ing] suspicious transactions to law enforcement, (2)
maintain[ing] records of large and/or suspicious transactions, (3) submit[ing] to
compliance reviews of their anti-money laundering efforts, and (4) develop[ing]
methods of identifying potentially dangerous customers.”192
On the international level, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the
primary entity responsible for oversight of AML/CFT and KYC obligations.193
The FATF, founded in 1989 to combat money laundering, is an
intergovernmental organization which monitors progress in implementing the
FATF Recommendations through mutual evaluations of member countries.194
There are two issues with regulating cryptocurrencies as a system of
payment. The first issue is the KYC obligations outlined above, are antithetical
to decentralized cryptocurrencies, particularly those which are “token-based.”195
Many private cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are pseudo-anonymous, an
appealing characteristics for many users.196 Not only could users abandon usage
of compliant cryptocurrencies, but implementation of such KYC obligations
would also be extremely difficult with private cryptocurrencies, given their
nature.197
The second issue with regulating cryptocurrencies as a system of payment is
a question about who in the cryptocurrency network is required to meet such
AML/CFT obligations.198 Bitcoin, and many other popular cryptocurrencies, are
190

31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012).
Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 322.
192
Id.
193
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 183, at 6.
194
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FORCE MANDATE (2012–2020) (Apr. 20, 2012).
195
Ariel Deschapell, Why Know-You-Customer Rules Won’t Work with Bitcoin, COINDESK (Apr. 13,
2014), https://www.coindesk.com/know-customer-rules-wont-work-bitcoin; see also Kahn et al., supra note 13,
at 3 (“Many of these new systems are ‘token-based’—that is, they rely on identification of the object being
transferred as a means of payment rather than relying on identification of the individual whose account is being
debited.”).
196
Brito, supra note 12, at 20–22; Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 297.
197
Id. at 328.
198
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39 at 531.
191
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unique in their decentralized nature.199 Arguably, the decentralized nature means
that all members of the network are money services businesses (MSBs), and thus
are all subject to these AML/CFT obligations.200
However, such obligations require significant investment on the part of the
MSB and imposing such an obligation upon every member of the Bitcoin
network would effectively kill the feasibility of cryptocurrencies.201 FinCEN
anticipated this problem in early 2013, releasing interpretive guidance “to clarify
the applicability of the regulations … to persons creating, obtaining, distributing,
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies.”202 In this guidance
memorandum, FinCEN stated that users “who obtain[] convertible virtual
currency and use[] it to purchase real or virtual goods or services” are not
MSBs.203 As a result, such users are generally not subject to FinCEN
requirements.204 On the other hand, “Administrators” and “Exchangers” do
qualify as MSBs and thus are subject to FinCEN regulations on AML and
CFT.205
3. Cryptocurrencies as Commodities
Commodities are defined as a “basic good used in commerce that is
interchangeable with other commodities of the same type.”206 One important
aspect of commodities is that there is little difference “between a commodity
coming from one producer and the same commodity coming from another
producer.”207 Oftentimes, the word “commodity” brings to mind a raw material
or agricultural product, which can be bought or sold at an exchange.208 Goods
199

See discussion supra Part III.A.
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39 at 521–23 (citing FinCEN, supra note 125).
201
Id. at 520, 558–59.
202
FinCEN, supra note 125.
203
Id. at 1–2. A user is a person that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or services. Id.
204
Id. at 2; see also Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 322.
205
FinCEN, supra note 125; see also Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 531 (AML regulations
promulgated by FinCEN “prescribe general risk-based assessment requirements for specific industries that the
federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) governs and impose certain additional responsibility for maintaining customeridentification programs and anti-money-laundering compliance programs for certain sub-industries otherwise
identified as ‘financial institutions.’ FinCEN’s 2013 and 2014 Guidances brought operators of virtual-currency
‘wallets’ and ‘exchanges’ into the scope of the term ‘money services’ and, accordingly, into the term ‘financial
institutions’ for BSA purposes.”).
206
Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Jan. 13,
2019).
207
Id. An example provided is that “[a] barrel of oil is basically the same product, regardless of the
producer. By contrast, for electronics merchandise, the quality and features of a given product may be completely
different depending on the producer.” Id.
208
Joshua Kennan, What Are Commodities and How Do You Trade Them?, THE BALANCE (June 29,
200
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such as gold and silver fall under the commodity regulations given that they are
“raw materials.”209 Bitcoin—as well as other cryptocurrencies—have often been
compared to precious metals such as gold and silver, given the economic value
of both.210 In recent years, the commodity regulators have had their
responsibilities broadened to include a wide range of derivatives, futures, and
swap contracts which extend far beyond raw materials and/or agricultural
products.211 Thus, even if the comparison between cryptocurrencies and
precious metals is unconvincing on its own, the expansion of commodity
regulator power lends further credence to their regulation of cryptocurrencies.
Regulation of commodities in the United States, as defined within the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), falls to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC).212 Recently, the CFTC expanded its regulatory umbrella
to include cryptocurrencies.213 Within the last few years, the CFTC has sought
to define “virtual currencies,”214 referred to in this Comment as private
cryptocurrencies, as a form of commodity within the CEA.215 Agencies in other

2018), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-commodities-356089.
209
Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Sept.
27, 2019).
210
See Alec Liu, Why Bitcoins Are Just Like Gold, VICE (Mar. 21, 2013), http://motherboard.vice.com/
blog/why-bitcoins-are-just-like-gold; Howden, supra note 5, at 765.
211
See, e.g., Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.
cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2018).
212
7 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
213
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Federal Court in New York Enters
Preliminary Injunction Order Against Patrick K. McDonnell and His Company CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin
Drop Markets in Connection with Fraudulent Virtual Currency Scheme (Mar. 6, 2018) (on file at https://www.
cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7702-18).
214
The CFTC defines “virtual currency” as a digital representation of value that functions as a medium of
exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value, but it does not have legal tender status. U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CUSTOMER ADVISORY: UNDERSTAND THE RISKS OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING
(Dec. 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@customerprotection/documents/file/
customeradvisory_urvct121517.pdf; see also In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15–29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept.
17, 2015); CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-CV-361, 2018 WL 1175156, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018) (“A
‘commodity’ encompasses virtual currency both in economic function and in the language of the statute.”).
215
CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 496–97 (D. Mass. 2018) (citations omitted)
(“[CFTC] responds that ‘a “commodity” for purposes of [the CEA definition] is broader than any particular type
or brand of that commodity.’ Pointing to the existence of Bitcoin futures contracts, it argues that contracts for
future delivery of virtual currencies are dealt in and that My Big Coin, as a virtual currency, is therefore a
commodity.”).

GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20

622

3/25/2020 4:16 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

countries, such as Canada216 and China,217 have undertaken similar steps. In
further support of the view that cryptocurrencies may be considered
commodities, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined in
2014 that it would treat cryptocurrencies as commodities, and thus property, for
purposes of taxation.218 When Bitcoin—or another cryptocurrency—is
exchanged for a good or a service—as opposed to fiat currency—the transaction
may constitute a barter exchange, particularly if that jurisdiction classifies
cryptocurrencies as commodities, assets, or property.219
On the international stage, such transactions would fall under the purview of
two systems of regulation: the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)220 and the
World Trade Organization (WTO).221 The UCC functions as judicial reference
helpful in settling disputes or litigation, but is not designed to proactively
regulate cryptocurrencies without a centralized authority.222 As this Comment
seeks to stress the need for a pro-active approach to developing a set of best
practices, the UCC lacks the necessary preventative aspects. This is where the
WTO enters the picture.
The WTO is tasked with supervising the movement of goods and reducing
obstacles to international trade.223 In addition, the WTO is responsible for
“administering and monitoring the application of the WTO’s agreed rules for
trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property
rights.”224 The WTO could take the position of the Canadian government,
classifying the exchange of cryptocurrencies as “barter exchanges.”225 If so, the
WTO would also be implying that cryptocurrencies are best classified as a

216
The Canada Revenue Service (CRA) “has characterized cryptocurrency as a commodity and not a
government-issued currency. Accordingly, the use of cryptocurrency to pay for goods or services is ‘treated as
a barter transaction.’” Mariam Al-Shikarchy et al., Canadian Taxation of Cryptocurrency… So Far, LEXOLOGY
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6283077e-9d32-4531-81a5-56355fa54f47;
see also GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 10–11.
217
GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 42, at 6.
218
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-1 C.B. 938.
219
See Al-Shikarchy, supra note 216 (“Accordingly, the use of cryptocurrency to pay for goods or services
is ‘treated as a barter transaction.’”).
220
See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 520–22 (discussing the applicability of U.C.C. Article
4A to regulation of cryptocurrencies).
221
See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING WTO 9 (5th ed. 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
222
See Howden, supra note 5, at 765.
223
UNDERSTANDING WTO, supra note 222, at 9.
224
WORLD TRADE ORG., OVERVIEW, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.
htm; see id.
225
See Al-Shikarchy, supra note 216; Howden, supra note 5, at 763.
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good.226 The WTO could thus regulate cryptocurrencies as the organization
“designated with supervising and facilitating trade transactions … across
borders.”227 However, one of the limitations of the WTO jurisdiction is that “the
WTO serves as a forum where member governments can go to try to sort out
any trade issues between one another.”228 Thus, the WTO, as a forum for
governments, would not necessarily be able to address concerns of private
cryptocurrency as they relate to individual users.229
4. Cryptocurrencies as a Form of Currency
Bitcoin and many other private cryptocurrencies share a number of
characteristics with money or currency.230 Before evaluating whether private
cryptocurrencies are money or currency, it is important to understand the
definitions of each, as the terms are often confused.231 Money is a “mutually
recognized representation of value.”232 Money acts as “(1) a medium of
exchange, (2) a unit of account, and (3) a store of value.”233 Currency, has a
similar definition, but importantly it is money “accepted by a government.”234
Few countries have been willing to accept Bitcoin or other private
cryptocurrencies as “currency.”235 However, one national government has
already made the move to classify cryptocurrencies as a form of private
currency.236 Just like fiat currencies, a major element of the popularity of Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies is that it “is exactly like religion. It’s based entirely
on faith.”237

226

Howden, supra note 5, at 763.
Id. at 764.
228
Id. at 781.
229
See generally id.
230
See id. at 762.
231
Compare Perkins, supra note 69, at 2 (differentiating between currency and money) and Currency,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currency.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2019), with Grinberg,
supra note 11 (seemingly mixing definitions of money and currency). Further complicating these similar terms
is the addition of the term “legal tender.” See discussion, infra Part V.A.
232
Perkins, supra note 69, at 2.
233
Id. Money is evaluated on its ability to meet each of those functions. Id. (“To function as a medium of
exchange, the thing must be tradable and agreed to have value. To function as unit of account, the thing must act
as a good measurement system. To function as a store of value, the thing must be able to purchase approximately
the same value of goods and services at some future date as it can purchase now.”).
234
Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (emphasis added).
235
See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 at 1–4.
236
Spaven, supra note 38; see also, O’Neal, supra note 50 (discussing Japan’s recognition of Bitcoin as
currency or legal tender).
237
Matthew Yeomans, The Quest for a Global E-Currency, CNN (Sept. 28, 1999, 10:28 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/TECH/computing/9909/28/global.e.currency.idg/index.html
227
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No U.S. government agency currently regulates Bitcoin or any other
cryptocurrency, as a form of currency. However, an attempt to regulate Bitcoin
as a form of currency can be identified in Germany.238 Germany recognizes
Bitcoin as a “private currency,” which only grants Bitcoin the status of a
“financial instrument.”239 Thus, while Germany technically recognizes Bitcoin
as a form of currency, it does not recognize Bitcoin or any other private
cryptocurrency as a form of legal tender.240
At the international level of currency “regulation,” the IMF is probably the
most authoritative organization. The IMF was created following WWII to
address problems created after the collapse of the gold standard.241 The
organization was given a mandate to regain control over the international
monetary and financial systems, so as to provide stability and predictability for
all international actors and states.242
While not officially a regulatory agency, the IMF is the closest thing to a
regulatory agency of monetary policy on the international stage.243 The IMF is
a cooperative fund which works with all 189-member countries, assessing their
economic and currency policies, while providing suggestions and undertaking
studies, so as to accomplish its mission.244 The primary goal of the IMF is to
provide stability to the international monetary system.245 More specifically, one
of the primary responsibilities of the IMF is to coordinate and maintain order in
the international foreign exchange market.246
The primary goal and responsibility of the IMF seems to parallel well with
some of the issues presented by private cryptocurrency. There is just one

238

Spaven, supra note 38; see also, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
240
Id. at 40–41.
241
Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395.
242
Id.
243
Following the collapse of the gold standard in 1945, the IMF was responsible for coordinating and
ensuring implementation of the Bretton Woods system. Id. In 1978, following the “Nixon shock” of 1971, the
IMF amended its Articles of Agreement, permitting individual states more freedom to determine their exchange
rates. Id. The system set out by the IMF in 1978 continues to govern the international foreign exchange market
today. Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395; see also, JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CURRENCY
MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO, 1 (Jan. 28, 2011) (“The IMF is the leading international organization in
the area of monetary policy.”).
244
What We Do, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2019).
245
Id.
246
See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 1 (“The purposes of the International Monetary
Fund are: … (iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members,
and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.”).
239
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problem: the authority of the IMF is limited to countries which have signed onto
the IMF Articles of Agreement. Private cryptocurrencies are, by their nature,
separate from countries.247 Thus, while some commentators have tried, it is a
stretch to argue that the IMF could extend their authority to include oversight of
private cryptocurrencies. Moreover, even if the argument could be made in
theoretical terms, the feasibility of exercising such oversight is extremely low.
D. While There Exists a Regulatory Gray Area for Private Cryptocurrencies,
It Is Clear that a Single Organization Must Take Charge
While it is not clear how private cryptocurrencies might be regulated on a
global level, it seems most likely that a regulatory framework would parallel the
treatment of securities on the international stage.248 This regulatory scheme is
essentially a collection of national systems, with no consistent regulatory
requirements.249 If this were to be the regulatory structure which develops, it
could pose significant issues for effective regulation of cryptocurrencies, given
their cross-border reach.250 While not evaluating the overall effectiveness of this
piece-meal approach to regulation, it is important to consider the potential
limitations in considering how to best classify government-backed
cryptocurrencies. In identifying the limitations of this country-by-country
approach, it may be instructive to look to the smaller, but still parallel, example
of New York State’s BitLicense regulatory scheme.
In 2014, the most comprehensive private crypto regulations put forth by any
state was the “BitLicense” regulatory scheme for cryptocurrency related
businesses, proposed by the New York State Department of Financial Services
(NYDFS).251 The scheme itself provides for a money-transmitter regulatory
framework applied to cryptocurrency-market participants.252 While the NYDFS
proposed regulatory scheme was monumental,253 it also further highlighted

247
See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (“VCs [and thus, cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin], in principle, question the paradigm of state-supported fiat currencies and the dominant role that central
banks and conventional financial institutions have played in the operation of the financial system.”) For further
discussion of the IMF see infra Part V.
248
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
249
See id.
250
See COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 148.
251
Hughes, supra note 36, at 537.
252
Id. at 536–46 (discussing the specifics of the BitLicense regulatory scheme).
253
Id. at 537 (“Because it is the first comprehensive cryptocurrency-specific ‘money services’ licensing
and regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies both in the United States and worldwide, the BitLicense is
positioned to be the platform against which other cryptocurrency-specific ‘money services’ regulations are likely
to be measured.”).
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issues with piecemeal regulation as opposed to a more cohesive regulatory
scheme.254
Without the backing of a physical commodity, private cryptocurrencies are
susceptible to rapid change in valuation, as their value is a reflection of what the
market is willing to pay.255 Government-backed cryptocurrencies have the
advantage of government support, which seems likely help to control the price
volatility.256 While there are differences in how the two types of
cryptocurrencies are regulated on an international scale, the interaction of
private cryptocurrencies with currency-based regulations is instructive, allowing
fact-supported predictions, as opposed to pure speculation.
III. PRIVATE CRYPTOS VERSUS GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOS
There are some characteristics which are likely to remain the same when
comparing government-backed cryptocurrency to private cryptocurrencies.
Some of the most important characteristics, which are inherent to digital
currencies, are processing speeds and cross-border reach of such coins.257
A. How and Why Do They Differ?
In switching the discussion from private cryptocurrencies to governmentbacked cryptocurrencies, one of the biggest doubts raised by the core adopters258
of Bitcoin is the addition of a central authority.259 Government-backed

254
The primary issue highlighted was that “there is no failsafe way to determine where an internet user is
located geographically. There is no way to guarantee that one’s internet traffic will not touch a server in New
York … If there is no practical way for a virtual currency business to avoid engaging in activity that involves
New York, there is no true limitation on New York’s jurisdictional reach.” Hughes, supra note 36, at 540–41;
see also Shin, supra note 157.
255
See also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 22; Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112,
¶ 13 (“The value of cryptocurrencies does not have any backing from any source. They derive value solely from
the expectation that others would also value and use them.”).
256
See Koning, supra note 141, at 2 (“The removal of all central points of control over a currency has the
effect of sacrificing price stability, since the absence of an independent entity to ‘back’ the bitcoins in circulation
means that their price cannot be managed during periods of fluctuating demand …. Fedcoin is one solution to
the volatility problem. It reintroduces one central point of control to the monetary system by granting a central
bank the ability to set the supply of tokens on a Fedcoin blockchain.”).
257
COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 148, at 4.
258
Specifically, those individuals who do not believe that a central authority, such as the Federal Reserve,
should be able to control monetary policy to the degree that they are currently afforded. See Grinberg supra note
11, at 172.
259
See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (“VCs [and thus, cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin], in principle, question the paradigm of state-supported fiat currencies and the dominant role that central
banks and conventional financial institutions have played in the operation of the financial system.”).
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cryptocurrencies will likely exist on a centralized network, as opposed to the
decentralized, peer-to-peer network seen with private cryptocurrencies.260
As a result of the centralization of any proposed government-backed
cryptocurrency, such cryptocurrency is unlikely to be pseudo-anonymous.261
Even if the government were to propose a cryptocurrency with similar
characteristics to Bitcoin, with public and private keys, the centralization of the
underlying blockchain network would almost certainly allow the government to
eliminate any façade of pseudo-anonymity.262 At the same time, elimination of
such pseudo-anonymity may help to mitigate the concerns surrounding use in
connection with criminal activity.263
Another issue which would potentially be addressed via government backing
of a cryptocurrency is providing stability to the value of the coin.264 Private
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have been associated with price volatility,
partially derived from their lack of inherent value.265 In contrast, central bank
actions may allow governments to address such volatility concerns in the context
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.266
Some of the primary concerns surrounding the related issues of price
instability and lack of inherent value would seem to be addressed merely by the
backing of a stable government.267 The truth is that concerns about price stability
260
Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?, supra note 141; see also, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies,
supra note 85, at 5; Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 51–52; (“[T]he recent revisions to the Fifth AML
Directive, which provides for additional AML checks for virtual currencies, indicate that states are unlikely to
permit anonymous circulation of new units of digital currency”); but see Koning, supra note 141, at 28 (“Fedcoin
could provide cash-like levels of anonymity and censorship-resistance.”).
261
Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?, supra note 141.
262
Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 16–18.
263
Id.; see also, Koning, supra note 141 (“Fedcoin could provide cash-like levels of anonymity and
censorship- resistance, perhaps with a built-in mechanism that limits usage to small value payments so as to
reduce participation by criminals and tax dodgers.”).
264
See Koning, supra note 141 (“The removal of all central points of control over a currency has the effect
of sacrificing price stability, since the absence of an independent entity to ‘back’ the bitcoins in circulation means
that their price cannot be managed during periods of fluctuating demand. This price volatility in turn cripples
any appeal bitcoins might have to a broader audience. Fedcoin is one solution to the volatility problem. It
reintroduces one central point of control to the monetary system by granting a central bank the ability to set the
supply of tokens on a Fedcoin blockchain.”).
265
Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377; see also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 22.
266
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 1; accord., Doguet,
supra note 65, at 1119.
267
Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 13 (“Cryptocurrencies challenge the standard
concept of fiat currencies. The value of existing fiat currencies is backed by the creditworthiness of the central
bank and the government.”). However, while government guarantees may address some of the volatility issues
with cryptocurrencies, such backing does not necessarily stabilize cryptocurrencies in the context of the larger
monetary system. See Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 4 (“A central bank token would have to be designed
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and stability of the international monetary system remain, even with the blessing
of governments and their central banks.268
At least one high profile banker, Swiss National Bank governing board
member Andréa Maechler, has posited that government-backed
cryptocurrencies still present the potential to inject instability into the global
monetary system.269 Government-backed cryptocurrency has the potential to
cause enormous issues for the international community, the most pressing of
which is the threat to the stability of the international monetary system.
As mentioned above, one of the major issues with private cryptocurrencies
is a lack of stability, given the absence of inherent value in the coins.270 This
lack of inherent value, mixed with speculation from investors and the relative
uniqueness of the asset, have all contributed to price fluctuations which make
private cryptocurrencies impractical for daily use by the average consumer.271
Such impracticality would be unacceptable for government-backed
cryptocurrency. As the IMF has discussed, central banks will prefer that
government-backed cryptocurrencies support, or at least do not undermine, the
public policy goals of financial integrity, financial stability, and monetary policy
effectiveness.272
While the government’s backing of a cryptocurrency may well stabilize the
price of a cryptocurrency coin in the domestic scenario, the lack of any
international oversight could cause instability to the international monetary
system.273 Barring the adoption of a global oversight framework to address such
potential instability presented by government-backed crypto, the problems
arising from private cryptocurrencies will seem trivial.274

appropriately to allay the risk of becoming a source of financial instability.”).
268
See id.
269
Rinecker, supra note 21; see also, BIS, BIS ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT, CRYPTOCURRENCIES:
LOOKING BEYOND THE HYPE (June 24, 2018).
270
See discussion supra Part III.B.
271
Koning, supra note 141, at 27–28 (“While Bitcoin shows some promise as a digital currency, its
volatility makes it inaccessible to the majority of consumers.”).
272
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 18.
273
Eur. Banking Auth., EBA Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies,’ (July 4, 2014), https://www.eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf; see also Hughes &
Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 514 (2015).
274
See discussion infra Part V.B.

GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20

2020]

3/25/2020 4:16 PM

IMF BEST PRACTICES

629

B. What are the Major Issues Arising From these Differences?
State governments must recognize the potential issues arising from the
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrencies.275 The biggest
issues arising from differences between government-backed cryptocurrencies
and private cryptocurrencies are related to: (1) potential instability posed by
government-backed cryptocurrencies to the international monetary system,276
and (2) uncertainty arising from the inconsistent treatment of such
cryptocurrencies across differing jurisdictions.277
Some of these issues also arise with private cryptocurrencies, such as
Bitcoin.278 However, the key difference between private and governmentbacked cryptocurrency is the extent to which a government-backed
cryptocurrency might potentially be integrated within the global economy.279 A
private cryptocurrency, at least in the current day and age, is likely too small to
destabilize the entire international monetary system.280 But with governmentbacked cryptocurrency, the effects of destabilizing events are magnified because
of the order of financial inclusion possible with government-backed
cryptocurrencies.
National governments have not been quick or effective in their attempts to
regulate private cryptocurrency.281 Furthermore, these governments have opted
out of coordinating an effort to create a coherent framework for oversight or
regulation of private cryptocurrency.
There are certainly national governments and central banks that do recognize
the potential issues stemming from widespread proliferation of private
cryptocurrencies.282 As the Staff of the Global Legal Research Directorate noted
in their comparative summary:
One of the most common actions identified across the surveyed jurisdictions is government-issued notices about the pitfalls of investing in
the cryptocurrency markets. Such warnings, mostly issued by central
275
See CRYPTOASSETS TASKFORCE: FINAL REPORT, HM Treasury, Financial Conduct Authority, Bank of
England (Oct. 2018); Deschapell, supra note 191.
276
Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377; see also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶¶ 38–50 (discussing
the extent to which government-backed digital currency could undermine financial stability).
277
See generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9.
278
Lee et al., supra note 37.
279
Lagarde, supra note 32.
280
See Andrea O’Sullivan, How Do Cryptocurrencies Affect Monetary Policy?, COIN CENTER (June 20,
2018), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-do-cryptocurrencies-affect-monetary-policy.
281
See discussion supra Part III.C.
282
GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 1.
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banks, are largely designed to educate the citizenry about the difference between actual currencies, which are issued and guaranteed by
the state, and cryptocurrencies, which are not. Most government warnings note the added risk resulting from the high volatility associated
with cryptocurrencies and the fact that many of the organizations that
facilitate such transactions are unregulated. Most also note that citizens
who invest in cryptocurrencies do so at their own personal risk and
that no legal recourse is available to them in the event of loss.283

While there are a number of governments taking the above approach, there
are other countries which believe that private cryptocurrencies are too small of
a market and thus, “cannot jeopardize financial stability.”284 This belief that
private cryptocurrencies are too small of a market to cause major concern could
potentially be correct—one writer, using Bitcoin to draw a “rough sketch of the
current state of the market [of cryptocurrencies],” estimates Bitcoin’s $100
billion market capitalization constitutes approximately 0.11% of the world’s
broad money supply.285 Government-backed cryptocurrency may well flip that
conclusion on its head.286 Private cryptocurrency is still confined to a relatively
small number of users, with one estimate from 2015 expecting the Bitcoin userbase to consist of only 5 million active users worldwide.287 While private
cryptocurrencies are investable assets, they are still not widely accepted. A
government-backed digital currency could (or would, depending on the level of
adoption government-backed cryptocurrencies might enjoy) be nearly
equivalent to electronic cash and would be a part of the average citizen’s daily
life.288
Greater financial inclusion for members of society who historically have not
had much access to the traditional financial system is an oft-cited reason for the
283
Id. The comparative summary goes on to discuss the potential use of private cryptocurrencies for
criminal activity and fraud. Id.
284
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 55, at 6.
285
O’Sullivan, supra note 281.
286
See Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 1, 4 (“A central bank move into digital tokens will have important
effects on financial stability and competition. Today, private token-based forms of money, like cryptocurrencies,
do not seem to be a major threat to financial stability because they are not widely used as means of payments or
store of value. A central bank token would have to be designed appropriately to allay the risk of becoming a
source of financial instability.”).
287
See Everett Rosenfeld, Bitcoin to Near 5M Active Users by 2019, Remain Niche: Study, CNBC (Mar.
17, 2015, 6:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/17/bitcoin-to-near-5m-active-users-by-2019-remain-nichestudy.html (citing MORGANE KIMMICH, THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: BITCOIN & ALTCOIN IMPACT &
OPPORTUNITIES 2015-2019 (2019)).
288
Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing that part of the case for Central Bank Digital Currency is the
potential for greater financial inclusion of people and businesses in remote and marginalized regions); see also
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 34; Id. at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the
implementation of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion).
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appeal of government-backed cryptocurrency.289 The potential for greater
financial inclusion deriving from the widespread adoption of governmentbacked cryptocurrency, illuminates one of the larger concerns surrounding
government-backed cryptocurrency—that widespread adoption of these
currencies may eventually create risks to financial stability.290 While
governments may recognize the opportunity for financial inclusion, international
community action demonstrates a failure to recognize the dangerous
consequences that accompany such integration.
IV. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOCURRENCY IS EQUIVALENT TO LEGAL
TENDER; IT IS URGENT THAT THE IMF COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK
Given the novelty of government-backed cryptocurrency, there is a dearth
of regulation, as well as a lack of academic research on the topic of oversight.
Thus, to make an educated guess as to how government-backed cryptocurrency
might be classified, the review of current private cryptocurrency regulatory
schemes provides a starting point for classification and regulation of
government-backed cryptocurrency. Furthermore, the survey of these other
regulatory schemes may provide a framework for potential future regulations
governing other issues related to government-backed cryptocurrencies.
A. Government-Backed Cryptocurrencies Are Currencies (Or Legal Tender)
Currency is simply money that can be regularly used within an economy,
frequently with the acceptance or backing of the government.291 This parallels
often-times with the definition of legal tender.292 Legal tender is described as “a
form of payment recognized by law that must be accepted by a creditor towards
satisfaction of a debt or financial obligation.”293 No creditor is obligated to

289
See Lagarde, supra note 32 (“[D]igital currency offers great promise, through its ability to reach people
and businesses in remote and marginalized regions. We know that banks are not exactly rushing to serve poor
and rural populations.”); Brito, supra note 12, at 14–15.
290
See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 4 (discussing the risks which VCs and similar technologies,
such as cryptocurrencies, pose).
291
Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 440 (9th ed. 2009); Currency, supra note
232).
292
Id.
293
Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 276–78 (citing James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73,
84 (1887)); see also Legal Tender, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/legal-tender.asp (last
visited Sept. 19, 2019) (“Legal tender is any official medium of payment recognized by law that can be used to
extinguish a public or private debt, or meet a financial obligation.”).
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accept private cryptocurrencies; thus, denying such cryptocurrencies the status
of legal tender.294
Many of the proposed frameworks that were discussed in this Comment for
creation or regulation of government-backed cryptocurrencies contemplate that
such government-backed cryptocurrency would satisfy the above requirements
of legal tender.295 These government-backed cryptocurrencies would be “a form
of payment recognized by law” and would be widely accepted within the
international economy. 296
If government-backed cryptocurrency is given the status of legal tender,
which seems likely given the information above, such designation would likely
remove it from the purview of regulation over securities, commodities, and
systems of payment.297
Furthermore, while outside the bounds of this Comment, it seems relevant
to note the parallels between the current transition from paper fiat currency to
government-backed digital currency, and the historical transition from the gold
standard to the current system of national fiat monies and flexible exchange
rates.298
294

Id. at 278.
See, e.g., SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT: ACTION PLAN FOR 2018 (Dec.
2017),
https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/e-krona/2017/handlingsplan_ekrona_171221_
eng.pdf; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, the Riskbank’s e-krona project, the proposed “FedCoin,” and the
IMF reporting “Casting Light on Digital Currency.” SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49, at 8; Koning, supra
note 141; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, 30.
296
Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 276–78 (citing James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73,
84 (1887)).
297
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 200 (citing Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What is a Security
Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993) (“[I]t is generally acknowledged that
currency is not a security.”); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1280 n.4 (S.D.
Ohio 1996) (“foreign currency … is not a security as defined in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.”). The 1934 Act
excludes from the definition of security “currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10)). With
respect to regulation as a system of payment, it seems that if private cryptocurrencies are unlikely to be classified
as systems of payment, it is even more unlikely that government-backed cryptos would be classified as such.
But see, Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 505 (2015) (suggesting that Bitcoin could be regulated as a
system of payment entity).
298
Historically, much of the globe had a system of commodity money. Didenko & Buckley, supra note
16. In this system, money could be exchanged at a bank for an equivalent amount of some commodity, usually
gold, silver, or another previous metal. George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money, UNIV. OF GEORGIA, 1, 2
(Apr. 10, 2013). During the 20th century, the United States, and the rest of the world, transitioned from the gold
standard (a commodity money) to the Bretton Woods system (also a commodity money system), and finally, in
1971, to the current, “post-Nixon Shock” era. Paul Krugman, The Gold Bug Variations, SLATE (Nov. 22, 1996).
For further discussion, see Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 4
295
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While private cryptocurrencies currently exist in a gray zone of regulation,299
government-backing of such coins will provide considerably more clarity as to
the most appropriate regulatory classification.300 However, even though
government-backed cryptocurrencies may more easily be classified than are
private cryptocurrencies, these government-backed coins will still retain some
of the characteristics which originally placed cryptocurrencies in a regulatory
gray area.301
B. Regulatory Efforts Moving Forward—Single Entity Oversight
Cryptocurrencies, both government-backed and private, are unique in their
ability to cross borders with ease.302 While the current patchwork system of
regulation might address some problems presented by government-backed
cryptocurrency (such as those issues related to fraud and potential criminal
activity) the cross-border reach inherent in cryptocurrency (and digital currency,
more generally) will require international cooperation.303 The characteristics of
government-backed cryptocurrencies, at least as currently envisioned, are
unique. However, at its core, government-backed cryptocurrency is analogous
to paper, fiat currency. To address the possible instability presented by the
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrencies, the oversight
scheme most likely to be successful is one that parallels the oversight framework
currently in place governing fiat, paper currency.

(“Several are actively investigating the possibility of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This new central
bank liability would be a widely accessible digital form of fiat money, intended as legal tender. One day, it could
fully replace physical cash. CBDC seems to be a natural next step in the evolution of official coinage (from
metal-based money, to metal-backed banknotes, to physical fiat money).”).
299
See generally Goforth, supra note 31.
300
See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 19 (“The legal concept of currency is associated
with the power of the sovereign to establish a legal framework providing for central issuance of banknotes and
coins …. The legal concept of money is also based on the power of the state to regulate the monetary system.”).
301
Brito, supra note 12, at 22. Given the shifting regulatory environment for cryptocurrencies and those
who engage in crypto-related businesses, there is a great deal of confusion as to how these innovative products
may be used in a legal manner. See generally Goforth, supra note 31.
302
BIS, Digital Currencies, supra note 175.
303
ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26 (“Moreover,
regulatory responses are likely to be more effective if they are internationally coordinated. A patchwork of
inconsistent national-level regulatory responses to financial stability concerns may not address risks—as the
activity of agents in this market may be international.”).

GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20

634

3/25/2020 4:16 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

C. Why the IMF Can, and Should, Rapidly Expand Its Foray into the
Government-Backed Cryptocurrency Space
The IMF was established following World War II with the following express
purposes:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems …. (iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among
members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. (iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade ….
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments
of members.304

The IMF was, and is, tasked with ensuring the stability of the international
monetary system.305 By signing the Articles of Agreement, states bind
themselves to the IMF and as such, the IMF may impose obligations on
signatories.306 The IMF imposes obligations on member countries via numerous
articles in the IMF founding document, including Article IV307 and Article
VIII.308 The most important obligation relating to potential concerns about an
intentional injection of instability is that IMF member-states must, “avoid
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members.”309
Two other IMF member-states obligations which would help to maintain
stability in the international monetary system are a “commitment to pursue
policies that are conducive to orderly economic growth and reasonable price
stability, … and to provide the IMF with data about its economy.”310 To enforce
these obligations and further its founding purpose, the IMF has a few
mechanisms of power at its disposal. One of these powers, termed
304

IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 1.
Id.
306
Obligations and Benefits of IMF Membership, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_bnfts.htm; see, e.g., Article IV consultations, further discussed infra n.78.
307
See generally IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 4.
308
See generally id. art. 8.
309
Id. art. 4.
310
Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2019).
305
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“surveillance,”311 involves the IMF’s process of the regular monitoring of
economies and associated provision of policy advice, which “is intended to
identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead to financial or economic
instability.”312
One of the most important Articles with respect to the IMF and its capacity
to implement oversight of government-backed cryptocurrency is Article IV.313
Article IV, Section 5(a), mentions “separate currencies” and seems to grant “a
means by which the IMF can exercise indirect control over currencies not
formally within its reach.”314 Thus, even if a government does not consider its
cryptocurrency to be an “official currency” of the country, the IMF may still
exercise authority as it relates to oversight and/or best practices.
Private cryptocurrencies are currently regulated on a country-by-country
basis.315 However, this is not the ideal regulatory scheme for any form of
cryptocurrency given the characteristics of the technology and the widespread
risk posed by such characteristics.316
1. The IMF Should Lead the Push for an International Oversight
Framework
The IMF, in pushing for an oversight framework, should focus on providing
legitimacy to government-backed cryptocurrencies. Providing legitimacy to
valid government-backed cryptocurrencies will supply the necessary consumer
confidence in such currency markets. Consistent consumer confidence in the

311
Id. There are three types of surveillance undertaken by the IMF—Country Surveillance, Regional
Surveillance, and Global Surveillance. Id.
312
Id. The IMF’s regular monitoring of economies and associated provision of policy advice is intended
to identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead to financial or economic instability. Id.
313
See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 404 (quoting IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 4) (“The
precise meaning of these provisions—and the intent that motivates how they should operate—is unclear. Article
IV, Section 5(a) mentions ‘separate currencies’ by referencing Article XXXI, Section 2, the provision under
which signatories accede to the Article of Agreement …. Presumably, this suggests that the reference to ‘separate
currencies’ in Article IV is meant to hold principal nation-states responsible for the currencies of their
subsidiaries …. In essence, Article IV, Section 5’s reference to ‘separate currencies’ is best read as authorizing
a means by which the IMF can exercise indirect control over currencies not formally within its reach.”).
314
Id.
315
See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9.
316
See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 556–58 (2015) (discussing the ease with which
cryptocurrencies can flow across borders, with at least a measure of pseudo-anonymity and highlighting failings
identified in New York state’s attempt to regulate private cryptocurrencies on its own). Furthermore, the authors
highlight potential jurisdictional issues with regulating cryptocurrencies which regularly cross borders. Id. at
539–42; see also Shin, supra note 157; ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra
note 14, at 26.

GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20

636

3/25/2020 4:16 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

reliability of government-backed cryptocurrencies will help to provide stability
to the currency markets. Given that the primary purpose of the IMF is to ensure
the stability of the international monetary system, it would certainly be
appropriate for the IMF to assert their authority here. If the IMF fails to assert
its leadership in this arena, it could lead to instability within the international
monetary system, a less consequential parallel of which can be seen in the
unstable private cryptocurrency market. Proliferation of government-backed
cryptocurrencies could potentially de-stabilize the entire international monetary
system, as outlined throughout this Comment.
For government-backed cryptocurrencies, the international oversight
framework is most likely to emerge from consultations by and with the IMF.
Government-backed cryptocurrencies share a number of characteristics with
legal tender or currency as they currently exist.317 The IMF, given its historical
importance in transitioning the world from the gold standard to the current
system of paper fiat currency, has plenty of experience re-working their
mechanisms to adapt to changing times and changing technology. This
demonstrated experience will be invaluable should we continue transitioning
towards digital currency. Further, as referenced frequently, there is a need for
international consensus on how to deal with these government-backed
cryptocurrencies, as regulation on a country-by-country basis simply cannot get
the job done.
2. Limits of IMF Oversight
If the IMF takes the lead in developing an international oversight framework
for government-backed cryptocurrency, it would be a significant step in the right
direction. By taking the lead, the IMF can signal the urgency required to
proactively address the issues highlighted here. However, an oversight
framework centered around the IMF will not address all of the issues with
government-backed crypto. Just as with paper fiat currency, there are State
obligations and international organizations dedicated entirely to ensuring that
AML/CFT guidelines are followed. Furthermore, there are domestic agencies
which deal with fraudulent actors. And most importantly, any oversight
framework involving the IMF will continue to rely on the actions of individual
central banks around the globe to develop well-reasoned monetary policy in a

317
While money, currency, and legal tender are often used in common parlance as equal substitutes, there
are some key differences. The primary difference for a currency is the wide acceptance of a medium of exchange,
particularly acceptance by government actors. Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 440
(9th ed. 2009)); Currency, supra note 231.
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manner which provides stability both domestically and (at least to a degree)
internationally. Proposing that the IMF take the lead in developing an oversight
framework for government-backed cryptos is merely the beginning of a long
process, which will inevitably require many other actors in both the domestic
and international spheres.
CONCLUSION
Cryptocurrencies have become one of the most talked about news subjects
over the last few years. Questions about their benefits to society as a whole, as
well as the potential dangers they present to both individuals and institutions
have topped the list of many regulatory agencies, both within the United States
and across the globe. This emerging technology has led to questioning of current
regulatory regimes and whether the technology is too sophisticated to fit within
already-existing regulatory regimes. Furthermore, given the many
characteristics inherent in cryptocurrencies, states have varied greatly in their
approaches to regulation.
It may be awhile before the international community figures out how to
regulate private cryptocurrencies, beyond the current piecemeal approach.
However, along with the focus on private cryptocurrencies, there has been an
increase in interest surrounding government-backed cryptocurrencies. These
government-backed cryptocurrencies present many of the same questions that
surround private cryptocurrencies, but at potentially greater economies of scale.
Classification of private cryptocurrencies is a conundrum and only time will
tell what regulatory scheme is most effective. Government-backed
cryptocurrency, however, is relatively easy to classify as legal tender or a form
of currency. Given the potential dangers of government-backed cryptocurrency,
this is fortunate. Lacking, however, is an organization willing to step up and take
the reins and push for oversight of government-backed cryptocurrencies, before
they destabilize the international monetary system. Governments could wait for
further developments in the government-backed cryptocurrency space, but given
experiences with private cryptocurrency regulation, it would be more effective
to take a proactive approach. Considering this need for proactivity, and looking
within the international community, the organization best equipped to handle
this challenge is the IMF.
The IMF should work with individual countries and the international
community as a whole to create an oversight framework (or at least a consensus
system of best practices). This approach would include allowing the agency to
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extend its monitoring and country surveillance programs over governmentbacked cryptocurrencies. The controls the IMF places on these currencies do not
need to be strict. Many scholars have voiced concern that over-regulation (or
under-regulation for that matter) could substantially limit the potential of
cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology in general.318
If properly implemented (i.e., not over-bearing) and designed to enable the
IMF to adjust rapidly to technological advancements, such an oversight
framework ought to result in a much more globally appealing system of
currency, even more so than paper (i.e., fiat) currency or private
cryptocurrencies (which may still exist in a sort of regulatory gray area).
However, as exemplified in the opening hypothetical, if the international
community fails to create a cohesive oversight framework for governmentbacked cryptocurrencies quickly, the consequences will be disastrous to the
international monetary system.
JACOB GOLDSMITH*
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See Perkins, supra note 69, at 21 (“Supporters of cryptocurrencies further argue that if the United States
does not reduce the regulatory burdens involved in cryptocurrency exchanges, the country will be at a
disadvantage relative to others in regard to the development of cryptocurrency systems and platforms.”);
Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 173 (“Despite genuine concerns relating to bitcoins and criminal activity, this
Comment argues against any prohibition by policymakers or judges that encounter bitcoins.”).
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